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ABSTRACT
Analysis of Parallel Montgomery Multiplication in CUDA
by Yuheng Liu
For a given level of security, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) offers improved
efficiency over classic public key implementations. Point multiplication is the most
common operation in ECC and, consequently, any significant improvement in perfor-
mance will likely require accelerating point multiplication.
In ECC, the Montgomery algorithm is widely used for point multiplication. The
primary purpose of this project is to implement and analyze a parallel implementation
of the Montgomery algorithm as it is used in ECC. Specifically, the performance of
CPU-based Montgomery multiplication and a GPU-based implementation in CUDA
are compared.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
For the past 20 years, throughout many types of communication, especially over
the Internet, public key cryptography has become the major secure form of commu-
nication in the area of security. Public key cryptography is a crypto system with
two different keys. One key is called a public key, which is used for encryption, and
the other key is called a private key, which is used for decryption.The private key is
exclusive to users themselves and should not be revealed to anyone else. The public
key, as its named, is an open to everyone [1].
With higher security demands in massive computation or better performance in
mobile devices, new techniques have been developed over the past 20 years in public
key cryptography. In all new public key cryptography algorithms, the elliptic curve is
the most promising and best crypto when compared to the first generation public key
cryptography, such as RSA and Diffie-Hellman [2]. Similar to RSA, ECC offers vast
abilities in key generation, digital signatures, secure key distribution, and encryption,
etc [3]. Elliptic curves have more advantages in many aspects due to their rich and
complex mathematical structures. The strength of an elliptic curve cryptography is
increasing with the current booming mobile device industry. Wireless devices and
cellular phones have more limitations regarding computing power, battery supply,
storage, and processing capacity than computers, so efficiency of resource distribution
is crucial. One outstanding feature of ECC is that it provides an equivalent security
level to RSA with fewer key size, achieving a promising high security level, and, at
the same time, saves precious resources on mobile devices [3].
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According to [4], we realize that a core feature for changing the execution time
of ECC is multiplication. As the most crucial mathematic operation, multiplication
has been studied in many papers in order to improve the performance of ECC.
1.1 Previous work
Research in both software and hardware have been done in terms of accelerating
multiplication of elliptic curve cryptography. In paper [5], an algorithm is presented
that multiplies polynomials with integer coefficients, efficiently using the Number
Theoretic transform (NTT) on GPU. Another article [7] utilizes residue number sys-
tem to modular exponentiation in order to attain the best performance on a GPU in
terms of throughput and latency. In the hardware research area, we have seen the
development of [6] a cryptographic processor architecture for elliptic curve in GF(2m)
in an attemp to achieve higher performance [6]. By using FPGA and an applied,
widely used, Montgomery algorithm, this study [8] perform an extreme fast point
multiplication of elliptic curve. They claim that their result is more than 3.4 times
faster than other work reported within the literature.
1.2 Organization
This research project introduces a parallel method for multiplication based on
the Montgomery algorithm and implementation in CUDA programming language in
an attempt to achieve a higher execute time.
The project is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides background knowledge
and presents an overview of elliptic curve cryptography. In Chapter 3, we present
the mathematics of elliptic curve cryptography which is the basis for this project.
Chapter 4 describes the Montgomery algorithm. In Chapter 5, we briefly give an
2
introduction for the parallel technique CUDA. In Chapter 6, we present the design
and implementation of parallel Montgomery multiplication in CUDA architecture.
Our experiments, results, and an analysis are discussed in chapter 7. In the end, we
present our conclusion and future work.
3
CHAPTER 2
Elliptic Curve Cryptography
2.1 Background
Elliptic Curve Cryptography(ECC) was first discovered by Neal Koblitz and
Victor Miller in 1985 independently. It solves a discrete logarithm problem which is
the core and strength leading to why elliptic curve cryptography is more secure than
RSA [8].
There are many advantages to using various aspects of elliptic curve cryptogra-
phy. One is that it can reach the same level of security as RSA while using a smaller
key size; this not only saves computer power comsumption, especially when using
wireless devices, but also requires less memory. This is a very attractive feature for
mobile devices, tablets, and especially on smart cards. Another advantage is from an
internal structure, mathematics, is that ECC is aimed at solving a discrete logarithm
problem, which is more difficult than the problem that RSA can solve, which is in-
teger factorization [9]. We will discuss a discrete logarithm problem in the following
chapter.
An simple elliptic curve E can be displayed as follows [10]:
E : y2 = x3 + ax+ b
We denote a special point at infinity ∞. A typical elliptic curve, with points, is
displayed in Figure 1 [9].
Figure 1 shows a geometric figure of a point addition operation in ECC. It can
be defined as drawing a line between two points P and Q [9] in an attempt to gain the
4
Figure 1: An ellitpic curve
third point R. Discussed in a previous study [8], if geometric elliptic curves are over
an infinite field of real numbers, it is not practical for a cryptography background,
though better results are produced [8]. Therefore, an elliptic curve cryptographic
system should be designed in a finite field with large key size in order to satisfy
security and real world requirements. The specific mathematical illustration will be
explained in the next chapter.
2.2 Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP)
ECDLP has been considered as a difficult problem to solve in modern cryptog-
raphy, especially in public key cryptography. The problem is described as a point
multiplication of ECC that can be interpreted as follows: we have a point P on the
elliptic curve, in order to get point Q on the same elliptic curve, point P is added k
times to itself.
So ECDLP involves a scalar multiplication. When we have determined k and P
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then it is quite easier to find kP , which is Q. If we know point P and point Q, its very
hard to find the scalar K. In the case that scalar K becomes larger, it is considered
that K is computationally infeasible to obtain [11].
2.3 Fundamental of ECC
When it comes to choose an elliptic curve, for the level of cryptosystem is in
consideration, an important aspect when selecting an elliptic curve is to avoid su-
persingular curves [12]. The math can be much faster since several terms go to 0.
The curves presented in this paper are nonsupersingular and, to date, require fully
exponential algorithms to crack.
2.4 History of ECC
Nearly 20 years ago, elliptic curve cryptography was seen as one of the Discrete
Logarithm Problem-based crypto systems [11]. In 1985, Miller and Koblitz discovered
that elliptic curves could be very useful for public key cryptography. During that time
it was not very efficient to perform the needed calculations. By the late 1990s, the
way to implement the scheme was ten times faster, which allowed the performance of
elliptic curve mathematics to take the same amount of time as the implementation
of integer factorization for the same number of bits.
2.5 ECC vs RSA
As we mentioned in the previous chapter, one reason why we favor an elliptic
curve cryptosystem is that it requires fewer bits for the same security compared to a
cryptographical system, such as RSA and PGP. It’s known that security increases sub
exponentially in RSA cryptography, while in elliptic curve cryptography the increase
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of the security is exponentially [2]. This significant feature leads to a net reduc-
tion in computing power, cost, memory storage, and execute timing, which security
companies favor and is also endorsed by National Security Agency.
Although ECC is a more promising alternative as the foundation for future In-
ternet security, currently most applications use RSA. One reason is that the most
widespread public key algorithm, RSA, came first before ECC, its mathematics are
simpler than those involved in elliptic curve cryptography, and RSA is easier to im-
plement. Users like to use something that they are familiar with and find easy to
understand; ECC still has a long way to go before it becomes the mainstay of public
key cryptosystem. One other reason for its widespread use is that a company called
Certicomm owns many of the patents, including the curves themselves, and is making
it difficult to deal with ECC.
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CHAPTER 3
Mathematics of Elliptic Curve Cryptography
The ability to add any two points on a particular curve in order to obtain the third
point on the same curve is where the magic of Elliptic curves comes in. In geometric
meaning, refer to Figure 1, point addition is described as finding the Summation
P + Q, a line is drawn between point P and point Q, and arrive at the third point
P + Q = R, which is also on the elliptic curve. The difficulty to crack ECC is
exponential with key size if the elliptic curve parameters are base point and the form
of curves are chosen correctly.
The mathematics of Elliptic curves appear in different shapes when it comes to
different fields. This paper focuses on Elliptic curves in a Galois field. The mathe-
matics involved in this field are illustrated in detail.
3.1 Finite fields
A field satisfies the following properties [5]: a field has an additive identity el-
ement for the addition rules; a field has a multiplicative identity element for the
multiplication rules; and every element in a field has an inverse.
In honor of Evariste Galois, a finite field is also named as the Galois field, which
consists of an addition operation, a multiplication operation, and an inversion oper-
ation. Noted here is that these two operations, addition and multiplication, are not
traditional mathematical addition and multiplication in different fields [8].
Prime fields GF(Zp) and binary fields GF(2
m) are two main types of finite fields
that are widely used in elliptic curve cryptography. We count all integers between 1
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and a prime p in prime fields. Binary fields have a set number of bits in binary form.
For elliptic curves, this corresponds to
y2 = x3 + ax+ b mod p for prime fields
and
y2 + xy = x3 + ax+ b for binary fields.
In binary fields, there are a polynomial basis and a normal basis that can be selected
as the representation of elements. We focus on a polynomial basis in this project
since it is faster and easier to realize. Figure 2 shows the overall picture of elliptic
curves taxnomy.
Figure 2: Structure of Elliptic Curves
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3.2 Characteristic of a field
The meaning of the characteristic of a field can be interpreted as the number of
values in a field. Therefore, if a field has characteristic p, we write the characteristic
of that field as Fp. This kind of finite field is also known as Galois Fields in honor of
the mathematician who was the first one to describe them.
3.3 Polynomial basis
3.3.1 Introduction to polynomials
The definition of a polynomial is the sum of different powers of a variable. For
example:
x5 + 3x2 + 6
In this case, the arithmetic above has not set the polynomial equal to any specific
constant, thus there is no way to know the value of x. Furthermore, the arithmetic
assumes that the coefficients of the polynomial are real and that x is real or possi-
bly complex. For computer arithmetic, to prevent numbers from exceeding storage
capacity, we select coefficients modulo 10 in this example. Suppose we add another
polynomial to the above one:
x3 + 7x2 + 6
Since the coefficients are modulo 10, we have:
x5 + x3 + 2
This type of arithmetic is called a polynomial basis. Suppose a prime number is
chosen for the modulus of the coefficients. Then we have a polynomial basis over a
finite field. This is an important concept for cryptography, error correction, and so
on. The related deep knowledge can be read [19].
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For our project, and for a computer and cryptography perspective, we choose
the prime number 2 as the modulus, which means the coefficients can only take on
the value of zero or one. For computer storage, the polynomials can be stored as
continuous bits in the memory with each bit position representing the coefficient of
a power of x. For example, a polynomial as such:
x8 + x5 + x3 + x+ 2
would be stored on a computer as:
100100011 represents each position of bits representing the coefficient of a power of
x and 876543210 represents the corresponging index.
3.3.2 Polynomial basis represenation
The standard binary field element representation is the coefficients of a polyno-
mial. We take the coefficients modulo 2 to facilitate an efficient implementation and
make them binary. This allows an element to be defined as a string of bits. The
polynomial representation of an element in GF (2m) is given as [21]:
am−1xm−1 + am−2xm−2 + · · ·+ a2x2 + a1x+ a0 : aii ∈ (0, 1)
3.3.3 Addition and subtraction
Addition modulo 2 is just exclusive-or. For example, 1 + 1 = 0 mod 2, 0 + 1 =
1 mod 2, and 0 + 0 = 0 mod 2. In a computer operation, we can use the XOR
instruction to add two polynomials rapidly. There is no carry to propagate, which is
a very fast operation, even in high-level languages.
Addition and subtraction are true and only true for mod 2 coefficients. For
example, 1− 1 = 0, since 1 + 1 = 0 mod 2, addition equals to subtraction. Therefore,
11
in binary modular mathematics, we recognize addition and subtraction as the same
type of operation.
3.3.4 Multiplication
Modular multiplication is an important operation in popular Public Key Cryp-
tography, such as ECC and RSA, with a different implementation approach.
In a polynomial basis for ECC, multiplication is simply a shift and exclusive-or
operation. Note that the highest exponent keeps increasing in the polynomial. The
high exponent is called the degree of the polynomial. We never want is the degree of
polynomials to overflow our storage capacity. So we use modular math to solve this
problem. But there is a difference from an integer basis, instead of modulo being a
prime number, we want modulo to be a prime polynomial. A prime polynomial, also
known as an irreducible polynomial, is an identical concept using different terms. An
irreducible polynomial is like a prime number and has no polynomial factors.
3.3.5 Inversion
An inversion is defined as follows: Given a(x) ∈ GF (2m), find a(x)−1 such that
a(x)a(x)−1 ≡ 1 mod f(x), where f(x) is the irreducible polynomial. The most pop-
ular method is the Extended Euclidean Algorithm, seen in Algorithm 3.1 . For an
implementation optimized for GF(2m), refer to Algorithm 3.2 [21, 5].
3.4 Mathematics of elliptic curves over Galois field
The Galois field, usually in the form of F2, could be represented either as a
polynomial basis or normal basis. An Elliptic curve equation could be based on one
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curve, which is called a Weierstrass form elliptic curve:
y2 + xy = x3 + a2x
2 + a6
The variable x and y cover a plane, and x, y can be integers, real, complex, polynomial
basis, or optimal normal basis. This is the part that makes the math deep. According
to previous research:
y2 + y = x3 + a4x+ a6
y2 + xy = x3 + a2x
2 + a6
The first equation is called a supersingular curve, which is not what we are looking
for though it can be calculated quickly. What we need is the second curve of the
equation, which is called nonsupersingular. Until now, no known attack has taken
full exponential time to conquer this method. Therefore, this form is perfect for
cryptographic applications. Another point we need to consider is to carefully choose
the correct coefficients in order to achieve maximum security benefits; incorrectly
selecting the wrong coefficients would let the curve become an easy target for a
cryptanalyst to attack [5].
3.5 Point Addition
Suppose we have two points P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2) that are distinct. The
sum of P and Q is R which finds a line across P and Q. Arithmatic notation [5]:
Given:
P = (x1, y1)
Q = (x2, y2)
Then:
R = P +Q = (x3, y3)
13
if P 6= Q:
θ =
y2 − y1
x2 − x1
x3 = θ
2 + θ + x1 + x2 + a2
y3 = θ(x1 + x3)− y1
if P = Q:
θ = x+
y
x
x3 = θ
2 + θ + a2
y3 = x
2 + (θ + 1)x3
The geometric meaning as follow in Figure A.13.
Figure 3: The geometric meaning of point addition P + Q = R
3.6 Point Doubling
Arithmetic notation [5]:
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When yP is not 0,
2P = R where
s =
3x2P + a
2yP
xR = s
2 − 2xP and yR = −yP + s(xP − xR)
Figure 4 The geometric meaning of point doubling.
Figure 4: Point doubling 2P = R
15
CHAPTER 4
Montgomery Algorithm
Montgomery’s algorithm is used for an efficient modular multiplication. As we
know, division operation is very time consuming. Montgomery’s algorithm can effi-
ciently calculate modular multiplication by not performing a division operation. From
an elliptic curve cryptography perspective, the Montgomery multiplication algorithm
could be in different forms and different coordinate systems in order to achieve the
best performance.
According to many cryptographic systems, modular multiplications usually op-
erate in chains. For example, RSA cryptographic system [4], Paillier’s probabilistic
public-key scheme [16], Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme [15], and elliptic curve
cryptography are required for a chain of modular multiplication with a large integer
or prime polynomial. Therefore, efficient design for implementing modular multipli-
cation is essential.
For mathematic representation, Montgomery’s algorithm and its other improve-
ments for modular multiplication are displayed as follows. x = a × b mod n. For
modular exponentiation is given as: x = ab mod n [7].
First, the basic procedures for Montgomery’s algorithm are convert all the
operands to Montgomery representations; second, we perform Montgomery’s algo-
rithm for each operations as required; finally, we convert all Montgomery representa-
tion of operands back to their original representations [4].
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4.1 General Montgomery multiplication algorithm
The Montgomery multiplication algorithm is a way to speed-up modular expo-
nentiation [22]. One good feature of Montgomery’s algorithm is that it works for any
modular N [23]. Suppose we want to calculate the following operation:
ab mod N
we select R = 2k, where k is large enough so that R > N . Because R is represented
as a power of two, it is very easy for a computer to determine the result of modulo
R. We know that the numbers used in computer computing are represeted as binary,
so the operation is a k bits shift.
N ′ and R′ are obtained as
RR′ −NN ′ = 1
R′ and N ′ can be found via Euclidean Algorithm.
Next, we need to find a Montgomery form, which are a′ = aR mod N and b′ =
bR mod N . The advantage and the power of a Montgomery form is that, when
repeated, multiplication is required, as it performs modular exponentiation.
Then, two numbers are multiplied under a Montgomery form, so that we get a
result which is also in a Montgomery form, refer to:
a′b′ = abR2
In order to have a result demonstrates a Montgomery form, we want to have
abR(mod N) not abR2. The following is a mathematical derivation in terms of how
to convert abR2 to abR(mod N).
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Let X = abR2, calculate
m = (X(mod R))N(mod R)
note that R = 2K , so that all modular operations are efficient.
Then let
x =
X +mN
R(mod R)
Verify x = abR (mod N)
x = xRR′ = XR′ = abR2R′ = abR(mod N)
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CHAPTER 5
CUDA
The activities involved in cryptographic systems are computationally intensive,
with some showing a significant features of parallelism. With the emergence of
general-purpose computing for graphics processing units, much research regarding
cryptographic computation has been done in these two cross areas. In this chap-
ter, we briefly introduce a popular parallel technique, CUDA, which is presented by
NVIDIA.
5.1 GPGPU
GPGPU is the short term for General-purpose computing on graphics processing
units, and is a GPU technique generally dealing with graphics data computation, but
also performs traditional application computation by CPU, such as in Cryptogra-
phy [24].
With GPGPU, engineers who want to explore the new usage of GPU perform
graphics data, as usual, in addition to taking advantage of applied stream processing
applied on non-graphics data.
The process is shown as the figure 5.
5.2 GPGPU Programming Concepts
There are some critical concepts involved in GPGPU programming that include
stream processing, GPU programming concepts, and GPU techniques. In conclusion,
an application that is perfect for GPGPU programming has the feature of arithmetic
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Figure 5: Traditional GC vs Programmable GC.
intensity, large data sets, minimal dependency between data elements, and high par-
allelism [25].
5.3 CUDA Architecture
NVIDIA introduces a general purpose parallel computing architecture, CUDA,
whose purpose is for normal use in a traditional computation area using NVIDIAs
CUDA-enabled graphics hardware [24]. A programmer can then use C, Fortran,
OpenCL, and DirectCompute programming languages to compute in parallel using
multi-core.
5.4 CUDA Programming Model
There are basically three core abstract concepts of a CUDA programming model,
they are hierarchy of thread groups, shared memories, and barrier synchronization.
Introducing these abstract concepts, we can perform parallelism such as data par-
allelism, thread parallelism, or task parallelism, that can direct a developer whether
to divide a problem they have into sub problems. Any available processor core can
schedule and execute any threads for each block in any order, no matter if it is in
sequential or in parallel. Therefore, a compiled CUDA program can run on any of
cores in an NVIDA’s GPU.
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Figure 6: Automatically scaling
For Figure 6, a multithreaded program can execute independently in any blocks
of threads [24]. Obviously, a multi-cores GPU can execute a multi-program in less
time than a GPU with fewer cores.
5.5 CUDA Threading model
The threading model of CUDA is single instruction, multiple data, and is short
for SIMD. In general, SIMD means the same instruction is performed on many pieces
of different data. Several Processors share a common Control Unit and Memory. All
processors receive the same instruction but operate on different data
Threads are grouped by a grid consisting of one dimension or two dimension
blocks. A block contains a set of threads. A parallel code, called a kernel, is executed
in multiple threads.
21
5.6 CUDA Memory architecture
Another important concept in parallel processing with multiple cores is how to
deal with memory allocation. When we use GPU to do calculations, we need to write
memory between the host (CPU) and the device (GPU) memory. Getting to know
the various types of memory is essential for a programmer who wants to program in
GPU with CUDA. We briefly explain the main four types of device memory: global
memory, texture memory, constant memory, and shared memory.
Global memory is the largest available chunk of memory and the slowest memory
store to access. Global memory is not cached.
Texture memory is a cached, read-only segment of memory. As it is named,
texture memory is optimized for 2D spatial locality and most of its usage, in reality,
is dealing with 2D textures.
Constant memory has the feature similar to texture memory. It’s cached and has
a read-only segment of memory that exists in the main memory of NVIDIA GPU. The
difference between constant memory and texture memory is that it is not particular
built for 2D spatial locality in an alternative way.
Shared memory shares memory across a unit block, so threads can access this
same block of memory. It is also where Kernel function parameters are stored. By
using a device code, other data can be moved into shared memory for manipulating.
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CHAPTER 6
Implementation and Experiment
6.1 Purpose and design
There are three main goals of this project, which are as follows:
1. Explore normal method for implementing scalar multiplication of elliptic curve
cryptography in finite field characteristic 2.
2. Improve scalar multiplication of elliptic curve cryptography using Montgomery’s
algorithm in a projective coordinate
3. Improve scalar multiplication of elliptic curve cryptography using Montgomery’s
algorithm in a projective coordinate
From a cryptographic perspective, elliptic curves can be defined over real num-
bers, complex numbers, and any other fields. This paper is interested on elliptic
curves defined over finite fields with characteristics of 2(Binary field).
The paper focus on a scalar multiplication operation of an elliptic curve cryp-
tography since scalar multiplication is the most important operation and is key to
the speed of elliptic curve cryptography. An improved scalar multiplication is used in
order to create an elliptic curve cryptography that is faster. Our study is using the
most popular research available for elliptic curve cryptography.
In this chapter, basic concepts of scalar multiplication will be introduced for the
preparation of the improved method. What follows are the implementations of regular
scalar multiplication, applying Montgomery’s algorithm to scalar multiplication, par-
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allel Montgomery multiplication in CUDA programming language, and comparison
to the other public key cryptography RSA.
6.2 Brief introduction of scalar multiplication
P is a point that belongs to an elliptic curve, and scalar K represents a positive
integer. We calculate the summation kP which means we add point P to itself K− 1
times. As known from previous research, scalar multiplication is also described as a
discrete logarithm problem.
6.3 Hierarchy of scalar multiplication
The three layer hierarchy of scalar multiplication is depicted in Figure 7. In this
way, the main implementation of scalar multiplication relies on the first and second
layer of the model. The first layer presents basic arithmetic operations that are the
basic foundation for scalar multiplication in elliptic curve cryptography. The second
layer includes point doubling and point addition for performing point mathematics
operations of elliptic curve crypto system. The third layer is the scalar multiplication
which consists of the first two layers. This paper focuses on the second layer used
to accelerate the speed of calculating scalar multiplication. There are also many
algorithms and strategies for the efficiency of computing arithmetic operations like
addition, squaring, division, multiplication, and inversion of the first layer; however,
this is not the scope of this paper. For those who are interested in those topics, refer
to [11].
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Figure 7: The three layer hierarchy of scalar multiplication
6.4 General scalar multiplication
In this section, we are implementing general scalar multiplication over a finite
field. In order to perform a scalar multiplication, we need to define our data storage
structure in order to storage the numbers we will use to manipulate, define elliptic
curve parameters, and arithmetic operations that consist of scalar multiplication. The
following section illustrate this information in detail.
25
6.4.1 Define data storage structure
define WORDSIZE (sizeof(int)*8)
define NUMBITS 163
define NUMWORD (NUMBITS/WORDSIZE)
define MAXLONG (NUMWORD+1)
typedef unsigned long ELEMENT;
typedef struct {
ELEMENT e[MAXLONG];
} FIELD2N;
WORDSIZE represents the number of bits in a machine word. NUMBITS is the
number of bits the polynomial math will be expected to work on, which is the degree
of irreducible polynomial mathematically. NUMWORD is the maximum index of machine
words into a polynomial array. MAXLONG represents the number of machine words
needed to hold a polynomial. Once the above variables are defined, we can define
field storage structure FIELD2N, which is a field of characteristic 2 GF(2m).
6.4.2 Define EC parameters
Elliptic curve parameters in this project include the curve you choose and base
point. We use the curve equation
y2 + xy = x3 + ax+ b
where a = 5 and b = 9. We choose (007, 308338392 3736842520 1350130208) as our
base point. This point is chosen by pre-calculated [11] and assured that it is on the
curve we have selected.
typedef struct {
INDEX form;
FIELD2N a2;
FIELD2N a6;
} CURVE;
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typedef struct {
FIELD2N x;
FIELD2N y;
} POINT;
typedef struct {
CURVE crv;
POINT pnt;
} EC PARAMETER;
6.4.3 Implement polynomial arithmetic operations
Polynomial addition is the exclusive-or of two sets of coefficients. For example:
INDEX i;
FOR LOOP (i) c.e[i] = a.e[i] XOR b.e[i];
Polynomial multiplication is slightly different from integer multiplication. Two
steps are needed to perform a complete polynomial modular multiplication. The first
routine will be a multiplication of two polynomials; in the second routine, we need
the product from the first routine modulo, a prime polynomial, in order to complete
the polynomial multiplication.
A prime polynomial is also called an irreducible polynomial. In mathematics, a
polynomial is defined as irreducible when it cannot be factored into the product of two,
and for polynomials case whose coefficients are of a specified type [26]. Identifying
whether a polynomial is a prime polynomial can be a large research topic in academy.
In this paper we use the existing prime polynomials from [11] that were previously
tested by mathematicians and engineers.
6.4.4 Point addition in affine coordinates
Affine coordinates are shown in the standard representation P = (x, y) for elliptic
curve points. Addition and doubling in affine coordinates are given in Chapter 3
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respectively.
6.4.5 Implement point doubling
The elliptic curve doubling routine we used here is for Schroeppel’s algorithm [11]
over polymomial basis. Using an input with P1, P3 as our source and destination, we
operate the equation P3 = 2 · P1.
6.4.6 Scalar multiplication
Scalar multiplication will be calculated based on Koblizs balance expansion [11],
which consists of point addition and point doubling.
6.5 Montgomery multiplication
In this section, Montgomery point multiplication is discussed in detail and is
used to compute point addition and point doubling. Basic arithmetic operations are
the same as the operations that are used in general scalar multiplication.
Lets define P (x) as a irreducible polynomial over GF(2m). We will make sure an
elliptic curve E(Fq) is non-supersingular and also set base points (x, y) ∈ GF (2m)that
satisfies the following equation,
y2 + xy = x3 + ax+ b
First we define point P = (x1, y1) and point Q = (x2, y2) which belong to the
curve. Then the sum of P and Q, P + Q = (x3, y3) and the subtraction of P and Q,
P −Q = (x4, y4), also on the curve [27],
x3 = x4 +
x1
x1 + x2
+ (
x1
x1 + x2
)2
From the above equation, the x coordinates of P , Q and P −Q which are x1, x2
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and x4 is all that we need to determine for the value of x4, which are the summation
of point P and Q. We use X/Z to represent the x coordinate of P . We then convert
2P = (X2P , Y2P , Z2P ) and P + Q = (X3, Y3, Z3) to a projective coordinate. The
process is computed as [11],
X2P = X
4 + b× Z4
Z2P = X
2 × Z2
Z3 = (X1 × Z2 +X2 × Z1)2
X3 = x× Z3 + (X1 × Z2)× (X2 × Z1)
Montgomery point multiplication
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for Montgomery point multiplication
Input : k = (kn−1, kn−2....., k1, k0)2 with kn−1 = 1, P (x, y) ∈ E(F2m)
Output : Q = kP
Set X1 = x, Z1 = 1, X2 = x
4 + b, Z2 = x
2
for i from n− 2 down to 0 do
if (ki = 1 then
Madd(X1, Z1, X2, Z2),Mdouble(X2, Z2)
else
Madd(X2, Z2, X1, Z1),Mdouble(X1, Z1)
end if
end for
Return(Q = Mxy(X1, Z1, X2, Z2))
Point addition: P (x, y) ∈ E(F2m) is a point defined on the curve E. Computing
point addition using the following algorithm Madd(X1, Z1, X2, Z2).
Point doubling - Mdouble(X2, Z2).
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm for Montgomery point addition
T1 = x
X1 = X1 × Z2
Z1 = Z1 ×X2
T2 = X1 × Z1
Z1 = Z1 +X1
Z1 = Z
2
1
X1 = Z1 × T1
X1 = X1 + T2
Algorithm 3 Algorithm for Montgomery point doubling
T1 = c
X = X2
Z = Z2
T1 = Z × T1
Z = Z ×X
T1 = T
2
1
X = X2
X = X + T1
6.6 Parallel Montgomery multiplication in CUDA
6.6.1 Design
Parallel scalar multiplication in CUDA is based on Montgomery’s algorithm over
a binary field from the previous chapter. In [23], it is stated that because of hardware
resource limitations, a trade off must be made for a fully parallel implementation
of the second and third layers. According to this study, the parallel on the second
layer demonstrates a better timing performance compared to the parallel on the third
layer, which is a more attractive approach.
Therefore, my investigation and design focuses on the point addition and point
doubling in the second layer. The design for each are as follows:
Parallel point addition: As algorithm 2 demonstrates, the first three operations
can be paralleled at the same time since they are calculated independently. T1 gains
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from x, X1 gains fromX1 and Z2 , Z1 gains from Z1 andX2 . In total, the point
addition computation is composed of one squaring, four multiplications, and two
additions. Without time-consuming inversion, this is more efficient.
Parallel point doubling: As algorithm 3 above demonstrates, the first three steps
can be paralleled at the same time since they are calculated independently. T1 gets
from c. X gets from X2. Z gets from Z2. Point doubling consists of one addition, two
multiplications, and four squarings, whose computational complexity is simpler than
point addition.
6.6.2 Implementation in CUDA
This approach achieves task parallelism using CUDA on NVIDIA GPUs. To
realize task parallelism in CUDA, we schedule independent tasks on devices that are
designed for data parallel or SPMD applications.
First, according to Montgomery multiplication in figure 4, in order to parallel
operations in point addition and in point doubling, we need to allocate memory for
the parameters that are being calculated for a GPU device. In figure 4, we need to
allocate x, y, X1, Z1, X2, Z2 using cudaMalloc.
Secondly, using cudaMemcpy we copy the data from a host memory to device
memory.
In our third step, figure 8, we enable two different kernels to be executed by the
GPU, this approach is used block partition to achieve parallelism. The two kernels
in the project refer to a Montgomery point addition and point doubling. All CUDA
programs define an execution configuration using two instructions that process a
kernel launch by setting a block dimension and a grid dimension. The block dimension
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specifies how many threads in each block, and the grid dimension refers to the total
number of threads to be launched. Once we have two kernels in different blocks,
Figure 8: Block Partitioning. Each kernel contains n blocks.
these two kernels will be issued as one along with the current CUDA scheduler to
conduct thread interleaving and block interleaving. Under each kernel(point addition
or point doubling) we can execute the multiplications in parallel as analyzed above
in the pre-fixed block by the following algorithm shown in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Algorithm for thread interleaving
merged kerne<<< dimGrid, dimBlock >>>(ptr1 1,ptr2 1,...,int dimGridKer-
nel1)
int index = blockID × dimBlock + threadID
if blockID ≤ dimGridKernel1 then then
kerne 1()
else
if index ¡ dimGrid then then
index = index - dimGridKernel1
kernel 2()
end if
end if
6.7 ECC vs RSA
In this section we will briefly compare the performance of ECC and RSA under
an equivalent key size.
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Here the comparison from [24] shows, with different key length, the timing of
key generation are different between ECC and RSA. As we show in Table 1, ECC
provides fewer key size than RSA but can achieve higher security level. The results
ECC Key length RSA Key length ECC times RSA times
163 1024 0.08 0.16
233 2240 0.18 7.47
283 3072 0.27 9.80
409 7680 0.64 133.90
571 153605 1.445 679.06
Table 1: Timing of key generation between ECC and RSA.
show that ECC outperforms RSA with the increasing key size.
33
CHAPTER 7
Results and analysis
In this chapter we apply three approaches for implementing a scalar multipli-
cation for ECC, described in Chapter 6, by calculating each executing time for per-
formance estimation, and comparing and analyzing the advantages and disadvan-
tages. Three algorithms are presented as follows and in this sequence: general scalar
multiplication, Montgomery scalar multiplication, and parallel Montgomery scalar
Multiplication in CUDA.
7.1 Hardware and software usage
In this section, we describe the hardware and software used for our experiments.
In particular, graphics cards were required to be CUDA enabled NVIDIA’s graphics
card. So that we can perform the necessary functions.
Hardware:
Processor 2.7 GHz Intel Core i7
Memory 8 GB 1600 MHz DDR3
Graphics NVIDIA GeForce GT 650M
Software:
CUDA kit 5
Nsight IDE
Language:
C, CUDA
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7.2 General scalar multiplication
The approach, in terms of how to implemenat general scalar multiplication, is
described in Chapter 6. We apply this method for a general scalar multiplication that
does not have a particular optimization or improvement.
7.2.1 Experiment 1
In our first experiment, we test the execution time(ms) of scalar multiplication
with a different key size and constant scalar k = 9 to evaluate performance.
Key size 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
75 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005
93 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.007
131 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.015
163 0.03 0.031 0.03 0.034 0.032 0.03 0.031 0.031
194 0.041 0.04 0.04 0.041 0.04 0.042 0.04 0.04
294 0.105 0.103 0.103 0.105 0.103 0.103 0.105 0.103
Table 2: Test cases for key size 75, 93, 131, 163, 194 and 294 for general scalar
multiplication
Table 2 shows eight test cases for each key size, we then calculate average time,
minimum time, maximum time, and standard deviation time depending on the test
case table. The following experiments, experiments 2 to 8, will follow the same format
as experiment 1.
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Key size Min Max Average Standard Devia-
tion
75 0.004 0.005 0.00475 0.00046291
93 0.007 0.008 0.007625 0.000517549
131 0.015 0.016 0.01525 0.00046291
163 0.03 0.034 0.031125 0.001356203
194 0.04 0.042 0.0405 0.000755929
294 0.103 0.105 0.10375 0.001035098
Table 3: Timings in key size 75, 93, 131, 163, 194 and 294 for general scalar multi-
plication
7.2.1.1 Analysis for experiment 1
As the results demonstrate, in Tables 2 and 3, in general scalar multiplication
the timing grows with increasing key size.
7.2.2 Experiment 2
In our second experiment, we test the execution time of scalar multiplication
with a different scalar k and constant key size = 163.
Table 4 demonstrates eight test cases for different scalar Ks, then we calculate an
average time, minimum time, maximum time, and standard deviation time depending
on the test case table.
7.2.2.1 Analysis for experiment 2
As our results demonstrate, in Tables 4 and 5, in general scalar multiplication
the timing grows with each increasing scalar K.
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Scalar K 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 0.03 0.031 0.03 0.034 0.032 0.03 0.031 0.031
30 0.205 0.202 0.206 0.204 0.206 0.206 0.204 0.212
90 0.884 0.874 0.879 0.87 0.874 0.878 0.882 0.875
160 1.806 1.81 1.802 1.822 1.813 1.801 1.814 1.808
240 3.053 3.041 3.058 3.049 3.051 3.069 3.042 3.07
360 4.965 4.937 4.968 4.977 4.978 4.961 4.968 4.982
Table 4: Test cases for different scalar K 9, 30, 90, 160, 240 and 360 for general scalar
multiplication
Scalar K Min Max Average Standard Devia-
tion
9 0.03 0.034 0.031125 0.001356203
30 0.202 0.212 0.205625 0.002924649
90 0.874 0.884 0.877 0.0046291
160 1.801 1.814 1.8095 0.00688684
240 3.041 3.07 3.054125 0.010986193
360 4.937 4.982 4.967 0.014081396
Table 5: Timings of different scalar K 9, 30, 90, 160, 240 and 360 for general scalar
multiplication
7.3 Montgomery scalar multiplication
7.3.1 Experiment 3
In this experiment, we test the execution time of a Montgomery scalar multipli-
cation using a projective coordinate with a different key size and a constant scalar k
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= 9. The algorithm is decribed in Chapter 6.
Key size 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
75 0.000175 0.000125 0.000127 0.000127 0.000128 0.000155 0.000129 0.000166
93 0.000155 0.000155 0.000153 0.000157 0.00015 0.000155 0.000153 0.000154
131 0.000463 0.000442 0.000466 0.000467 0.000514 0.000456 0.000486 0.000479
163 0.000686 0.000891 0.000726 0.000804 0.000686 0.000687 0.000783 0.0007
194 0.000942 0.000935 0.000932 0.000945 0.000963 0.000937 0.000929 0.000951
294 0.002006 0.001989 0.002017 0.00203 0.001987 0.001965 0.00216 0.002013
Table 6: Test cases for key size 75, 93, 131, 163, 194 and 294 for Montgomery scalar
multiplication
Key size Min Max Average Standard Devia-
tion
75 0.000125 0.000175 0.0001415 2.05E-05
93 0.00015 0.000155 0.000154 2.07E-06
131 0.000442 0.000514 0.000471625 2.17E-05
163 0.000686 0.000891 0.000745375 7.46E-05
194 0.000929 0.000963 0.00094175 1.12E-05
294 0.001965 0.00216 0.002020875 5.98E-05
Table 7: Timings in key size 75, 93, 131, 163, 194 and 294 Montgomery scalar multi-
plication
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7.3.1.1 Analysis for experiment 3
Our results demonstrate(Tables 6 and 7) in a Montgomery scalar multiplication
the timing grows with each increasing key size.
7.3.2 Experiment 4
In this experiment, we test the execution time of a Montgomery scalar multipli-
cation with a different scalar k and a constant key size = 163.
Scalar K 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 0.000686 0.000891 0.000726 0.000804 0.000686 0.000687 0.000783 0.0007
30 0.005166 0.005113 0.005179 0.0052 0.005098 0.005378 0.005279 0.005235
90 0.015125 0.015299 0.015225 0.01702 0.015749 0.015294 0.015248 0.015304
160 0.026006 0.027987 0.027135 0.027018 0.027046 0.027062 0.026988 0.029314
240 0.039941 0.042505 0.040353 0.040271 0.040626 0.041077 0.042141 0.042034
360 0.061651 0.062912 0.061381 0.060826 0.062725 0.061193 0.064061 0.06085
Table 8: Test cases for different scalar K 9, 30, 90, 160, 240 and 360 Montgomery
scalar multiplication
7.3.2.1 Analysis for experiment 4
Our results demonstrate (Tables 8 and 9) in a Montgomery scalar multiplication
the timing grows with each increasing scalar K.
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Scalar K Min Max Average Standard Devia-
tion
9 0.000686 0.000891 0.000745375 7.46E-05
30 0.005098 0.005378 0.005206 9.14E-05
90 0.015125 0.01702 0.015533 0.000628456
160 0.026006 0.029314 0.0273195 0.000965462
240 0.039941 0.042505 0.0411185 0.00098133
360 0.060826 0.064061 0.061949875 0.001161402
Table 9: Timings of different scalar K 9, 30, 90, 160, 240 and 360 Montgomery scalar
multiplication
7.4 Parallel Montgomery scalar Multiplication in CUDA
7.5 Experiment 5
In this experiment, we test an execution time for a parallel Montgomery scalar
multiplication without computing an allocation time from the main memory to GPU
memory while using a different key size and a constant scalar k = 9. The algorithm
is described in Chapter 6.
7.5.0.2 Analysis for experiment 5
Our results demonstrate (Tables 10 and 11) in a CUDA Montgomery scalar
multiplication, the timing grows with each increasing key size.
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Key size 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
75 0.000062 0.000065 0.000074 0.000067 0.000066 0.000064 0.000063 0.000066
93 0.000065 0.000066 0.000065 0.000061 0.000066 0.000066 0.000067 0.000066
131 0.000066 0.000066 0.000063 0.000065 0.000064 0.000063 0.000064 0.000065
163 0.000066 0.000064 0.000071 0.000065 0.000066 0.000107 0.000063 0.000067
194 0.000067 0.000068 0.000065 0.000066 0.000066 0.000063 0.000066 0.000067
294 0.000065 0.000062 0.000063 0.000064 0.000075 0.000064 0.000065 0.000063
Table 10: Test cases for key size 75, 93, 131, 163, 194 and 294 for CUDA Montgomery
multiplication
Key size Min Max Average Standard Devia-
tion
75 0.000062 0.000074 0.000065875 3.68E-06
93 0.000061 0.000067 0.00006525 1.83E-06
131 0.000063 0.000066 0.0000645 1.20E-06
163 0.000063 0.000107 0.000071125 1.47E-05
194 0.000063 0.000068 0.000066 1.51E-06
294 0.000062 0.000075 0.000065125 4.12E-06
Table 11: Timings in key size 75, 93, 131, 163, 194 and 294 for CUDA Montgomery
multiplication
7.5.1 Experiment 6
In experiment 6, we test the execution time of a parallel Montgomery scalar
multiplication with computing allocation time along with a different key size and a
constant scalar k = 9.
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Scalar K 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
75 0.275412 0.273803 0.255312 0.282646 0.272105 0.275174 0.284079 0.268895
93 0.376531 0.314122 0.3549 0.344457 0.323721 0.354259 0.336767 0.383522
131 0.563428 0.514985 0.526557 0.554458 0.530579 0.537951 0.568609 0.543341
163 0.690852 0.759843 0.668226 0.669494 0.690764 0.715209 0.729618 0.703363
194 0.875926 0.854781 0.833686 0.936573 0.915386 0.855753 0.907927 0.94181
294 1.618554 1.633568 1.676067 1.642039 1.609354 1.663714 1.660483 1.645004
Table 12: Test cases for key size 75, 93, 131, 163, 194 and 294 for CUDA Montgomery
multiplication with allocation overhead
Scalar K Min Max Average Standard Devia-
tion
75 0.255312 0.284079 0.27342825 0.0089125
93 0.314122 0.383522 0.348534875 0.024012641
131 0.514985 0.568609 0.5424885 0.018660191
163 0.668226 0.759843 0.703421125 0.030976014
194 0.833686 0.94181 0.89023025 0.040710303
294 1.609354 1.676067 1.643597875 0.022831227
Table 13: Timings in key size 75, 93, 131, 163, 194 and 294 for CUDA Montgomery
multiplication with allocation overhead
7.5.1.1 Analysis for experiment 6
Our results demonstrate (Tables 12 and 13) in a CUDA Montgomery scalar
multiplication, along with memory allocation overhead, the timing grows with each
increasing key size.
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7.5.2 Experiment 7
In experiment 7, we test the execution time of a parallel Montgomery scalar
multiplication without a computing allocation time while using a different scalar k
and constant key size = 163.
Scalar K 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 0.000064 0.000064 0.000067 0.000066 0.000065 0.000065 0.000065 0.000066
30 0.000072 0.00008 0.000073 0.000073 0.00007 0.000075 0.000074 0.000071
90 0.00009 0.000096 0.000085 0.000088 0.000085 0.000086 0.000083 0.00009
160 0.000097 0.000092 0.000094 0.000092 0.000094 0.000097 0.000092 0.000092
240 0.000096 0.000096 0.000091 0.000096 0.000095 0.000093 0.000095 0.000096
360 0.000102 0.000098 0.000098 0.0001 0.000101 0.000098 0.000098 0.000104
Table 14: Test cases for different scalar K 9, 30, 90, 160, 240 and 360 for CUDA
Montgomery multiplication
Scalar K Min Max Average Standard Devia-
tion
9 0.000064 0.000067 0.00006525 1.04E-06
30 0.00007 0.00008 0.0000735 3.07E-06
90 0.000083 0.000096 0.000087875 4.12E-06
160 0.000092 0.000097 0.00009375 2.19E-06
240 0.000091 0.000096 0.00009475 1.83E-06
360 0.000098 0.000104 0.000099875 2.30E-06
Table 15: Timings of different scalar K 9, 30, 90, 160, 240 and 360 for CUDA Mont-
gomery multiplication
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7.5.2.1 Analysis for experiment 7
Our results demonstrate (Tables 14 and 15) in a CUDA Montgomery scalar
multiplication the timing grows with each increasing scalar K.
7.5.3 Experiment 8
In experiment 8, we test the execution time of a parallel Montgomery scalar
multiplication along with computing allocation time while using a different scalar k
and a constant key size = 163.
Scalar K 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 0.700126 0.668529 0.665548 0.76269 0.723339 0.674247 0.710953 0.701169
30 0.837697 0.892199 0.822166 0.881156 0.777102 0.88086 0.855339 0.804022
90 1.101502 1.105301 1.02507 1.119897 1.112071 1.048786 1.032163 1.105014
160 1.139519 1.192315 1.226287 1.213454 1.22521 1.136232 1.130745 1.209691
240 1.209115 1.202208 1.189265 1.175106 1.233138 1.17945 1.211495 1.148747
360 1.260058 1.347244 1.359554 1.294778 1.264083 1.329231 1.294484 1.091362
Table 16: Test cases for different scalar K 9, 30, 90, 160, 240 and 360 for CUDA
Montgomery multiplication with allocation overhead
7.5.3.1 Analysis for experiment 8
Our results demonstrate (Tables 16 and 17) in a CUDA Montgomery scalar
multiplication along with memory allocation overhead the timing grows with each
increasing scalar K.
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Scalar K Min Max Average Standard Devia-
tion
9 0.665548 0.76269 0.700825125 0.03258227
30 0.777102 0.892199 0.843817625 0.041023883
90 1.02507 1.119897 1.0812255 0.03894406
160 1.130745 1.226287 1.184181625 0.041712163
240 1.148747 1.233138 1.1935655 0.026107257
360 1.091362 1.359554 1.28009925 0.084462766
Table 17: Timings of different scalar K 9, 30, 90, 160, 240 and 360 for CUDA Mont-
gomery multiplication with allocation overhead
7.6 Three methods comparison
In this section, we take the average timing, which are the results from the
last section, and use them as the estimation timing among our next three ap-
proaches. For representation convenience we will use Regular scalar multiplica-
tion(RSM), Montgomery scalar Multiplication(MSM), Parallel Montgomery Multi-
plication in CUDA(CUDAMSM) and Parallel Montgomery Multiplication in CUDA
with overhead(CUDAMSMO). CUDAMSN and CUDAMSMO are based on the same
algorithm, and the only different is CUDAMSMO calculate the time of CUDA over-
head.
7.6.1 Comparison in different key size
1. Timing of an ECC scalar multiplication comparison, with different key size
among RSM, MSN, CUDAMSM and CUDAMSMO, is demonstrated in table 18.
Runtime (Multiplication K = 9)
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Key size RSM MSM CUDAMSM CUDAMSMO
75 0.00475 0.0001415 0.000065875 0.27342825
93 0.007625 0.000154 0.00006725 0.348534875
131 0.01525 0.000471625 0.0000705 0.5424885
163 0.031125 0.000745375 0.000071125 0.703421125
194 0.0405 0.00094175 0.000074 0.89023025
294 0.10375 0.002020875 0.00008125 1.643597875
Table 18: Timing of scalar multiplication comparison with different key size among
RSM, MSN, CUDAMSM and CUDAMSMO
7.6.1.1 Analysis
Since the CUDAMSMO method produces a larger execution time, we extract
RSM, MSM, and CUDAMSN then compare them in one graph in order to illustrate
our results clearly and precisely. In figure 9, it is demonstrated that the Montgomery
algorithm can accerelate scalar multiplication rapidly with increasing key size more
than a general scalar multiplication, which is used in an elliptic curve cryptosys-
tem. CUDAMSM also demonstrates good results when the overhead of copying data
from local memory to device(GPU) memory is ignored. The reason is that using
Montgomery multiplication reduces divison and inversion operations. The timing
calculated for a Montgomery scalar multiplication, using projective coordinates, is
required up to (m− 1)(6M + 3A+ 5S) + (10M + 7A+ 4S + I)clock cycles, where M,
A, S and I are represented by the number of clock cycles for multiplication, addition,
squaring, and inversion, respectively [25]. Therefore, the scalar multiplication needs a
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Figure 9: Run time with different key size for Regular scalar multiplication VS Mont-
gomery scalar Multiplication VS Parallel Montgomery Multiplication in CUDA
991M + 976S+ 493A clock time in total which is overwhelming time consuming [19].
As our results demonstrate in figure 10, the Montgomery algorithm can largely
accelerate the speed of scalar multiplication for an ECC. The parallel Montgomery
method in CUDA can attain good results in the end; however, increased overhead of
transfer data from Host memory to device(GPU) memory can be expected and its
results are not optimal. For my project, CUDA overhead is created from: 1.allocated
new memory in GPU for the data I needed to calculate; 2. copied data from the host
memory to GPU memory; 3. copied results that were computed in the GPU back
to the host memory. The reason why CUDA overhead is so high is that the size of
an element depends on the key size; when the key size grows, the time for CUDA
to allocate memory(CUDA overhead) increases as well. For realistic applicaitons or
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Figure 10: Run time with different key size for RSM, MSN, CUDAMSM and CUD-
AMSMO
when using an efficient allocating method, we can overcome this disadvantage in the
future.
7.6.2 Comparison in different scalar K
2. Timing of an ECC scalar multiplication in comparison with different K ( Q =
KP) among RSM, MSN, CUDAMSM, and CUDAMSMO is demonstrated in table 18.
Runtime (key size: 163)
7.6.2.1 Analysis
Our results demonstrate (figure 11) with an increase in K the runtime of regu-
lar scalar multiplication (without any optimization) goes up extremely quick. Under
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Scalar K RSM MSM CUDAMSM CUDAMSMO
9 0.031125 0.000745375 0.00006525 0.700825125
30 0.205625 0.005206 0.0000735 0.843817625
90 0.877 0.015533 0.000087875 1.0812255
160 1.8095 0.0273195 0.00009375 1.184181625
240 3.054125 0.0411185 0.00009475 1.1935655
360 4.967 0.061949875 0.000099875 1.28009925
Table 19: Run time comparison of scalar multiplication with different K
these circumstances, the overhead produced from cuda allocation can be ignored when
the value of K becomes a large number. The time lost from the Montgomery multi-
plication over a projective coordinate is due to the algorithm presented in Chapter 6.
The times we perform a point addition and a point doubling declines significantly
since the scalar k is represented in its binary form. For example, if K = 360, we
need to compute P = kQ. In general when using a scalar multiplication we need to
run a loop 360 times in order to gain our final results. However in a Montgomery
point multiplication over a projective coordinate system k = 360 converts to an array:
k[9] = 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0; 101101000 is the binary form of 360. The times needed
for loop shrink becomes 9 times; this is a large reduction for scalar multiplication.
Other than the efficient computation gained from the Montgomery algorithm, we can
parallel two or more arithmetic operations at the same time; this improved process
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Figure 11: Run time with different K for Regular scalar multiplication VS Mont-
gomery scalar Multiplication VS Parallel Montgomery Multiplication in CUDA
can increase speed as well.
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusion and Future Work
In this project, a parallel design strategy in CUDA for elliptic curve point multi-
plication is presented in order to efficiently accelerate the speed and work along with
a scalar parameter K increasing. Our algorithm demonstrated good results with-
out CUDA allocation overhead. Therefore, in the future, we could study and apply
this new approach to access global memory in CUDA Kernels more efficiently. As a
whole, the architecture provided demonstrates a promising parallel solution in GPU
for elliptic curve scalar multiplication.
Future work should further explore better improvements in the areas of hardware
and software with in all three layers of scalar multiplication, implementing additional
design strategies in both software and hardware comparisons. Since inversion oper-
ation is an important operation within the arithmetic level of elliptic cuvres, this is
probably another interesting research topic for future study.
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APPENDIX
Algorithm
A.1 Inversion from Algorithm 3.1
Figure A.12: Extended Euclidean Algorithm for Polynomial Representation
A.2 Inversion for Algorithm 3.2
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Figure A.13: Inversion in GF(2m) for polynomial representation
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